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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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                         SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
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                              WESTERN DIVISION
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      UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, : Case No. 1:20-cr-00142-1
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               Plaintiff,
                                      : FINAL PRETRIAL CONFERENCE
                                      : Wednesday, June 1, 2022
 6
               - v -
                                      : 10:00 a.m.
 7
      ALEXANDER SITTENFELD, a/k/a
        "P.G. Sittenfeld,"
 8
               Defendant.
                                      : Cincinnati, Ohio
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                      TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
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       BEFORE THE HONORABLE DOUGLAS R. COLE, DISTRICT JUDGE
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      For the Plaintiff:
                                  EMILY N. GLATFELTER, ESQ.
12
                                  MATTHEW C. SINGER, ESQ.
                                  MEGAN GAFFNEY PAINTER, ESQ.
13
                                  U.S. Department of Justice
                                  U.S. Attorney's Office
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                                  Cincinnati, Ohio 45202
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PROCEEDINGS 1 2 (In open court at 10:04 a.m.) 3 THE COURT: Good morning. We're here in open court 4 and on the record in the matter of United States of America 5 6 versus Alexander Sittenfeld, case number 1:20-cr-142. 7 We're here this morning for the final pretrial 8 conference. Could I ask counsel to please enter their 9 appearances for the record. 10 MR. SINGER: Good morning, Your Honor. Matt Singer, 11 Emily Glatfelter, and Megan Gaffney Painter for the United 12 States. 13 THE COURT: Good morning. 14 MR. C. MATTHEW RITTGERS: Good morning, Your Honor. 15 Charlie M. Rittgers with Charlie. H. Rittgers for P.G. Sittenfeld. 16 THE COURT: Very good. And, sir, you are 17 P.G. Sittenfeld? 18 19 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. 20 THE COURT: And you are represented by Charlie H. 21 Rittgers and Charlie M. Rittgers, who are seated with you in 22 court today? 23 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. 24 THE COURT: Very good. All right. In terms of where 25 we're at, it's the Court's understanding we've got a six-count

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      indictment. Counts 1 and 2 are honest services wire fraud,
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      under 18 United States Code, Sections 1343 and 1346. Counts 3
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      and 5 are bribery concerning programs receiving federal funds,
      in violation of 18 United States Code,
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      Section 666(a)(1)(B).
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           And Counts 4 through 6 are attempted extortion under
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      color of official right, in violation of 18, United States
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      Code, Section 1951(a) and (b) (2).
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           Am I correct, Mr. Singer?
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               MR. SINGER: Yes, Your Honor.
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               THE COURT: Very good. In terms of plea
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      negotiations, have the parties completed any potential plea
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      negotiations in this case, Mr. Singer?
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               MR. SINGER: The government has extended a plea offer
      in the fall of 2021. That offer was rejected by defense
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      counsel.
               THE COURT: Would you like to make a record of that
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      offer?
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               MR. SINGER: Yes, Your Honor. The offer was to
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      recommendations relating to certain guideline stipulations,
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      and the government would cap their argument relating to a
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      potential term of imprisonment at 24 months, leaving the
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      defendant able to argue for a sentence of probation.
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               THE COURT:
                           Thank you, Mr. Singer.
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           Mr. Rittgers, can you confirm that you received that
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      offer from the United States Attorney's Office?
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               MR. C. MATTHEW RITTGERS: That is accurate,
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      Your Honor.
               THE COURT: And have you conveyed that offer to your
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      client?
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               MR. C. MATTHEW RITTGERS: Yes, I have.
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               THE COURT: Have you discussed that offer with your
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      client?
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               MR. C. MATTHEW RITTGERS: Yes, Your Honor.
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               THE COURT: Mr. Sittenfeld, are you aware the
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      government made that offer?
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               THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.
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               THE COURT: Have you had an opportunity to discuss
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      that offer with your attorney?
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               THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.
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               THE COURT: Do you need any further opportunity to
      discuss that offer with your attorneys further?
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               THE DEFENDANT: I do not, Your Honor.
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               THE COURT: And it is your intent to reject that
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      offer, is that right, sir?
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               THE DEFENDANT: It is, Your Honor.
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               THE COURT: Okay. Very good. All right. Where are
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      we on discovery? Are there any outstanding discovery issues,
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      Mr. Singer?
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               MR. SINGER: I do not believe there are any
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outstanding discovery issues. There are some materials that 1 2 we are getting from the agent. 3 For example, we took some photographs that were produced in the last discovery, not extensive by any means. There may 4 5 be additional, for example, what we're considering a demonstrative photo that shows where 435 was on the map, 6 7 little things like that. 8 There are particular Jencks Act statements relating 9 to -- that we are getting from the FBI that we have not 10 received yet, I think we discussed at our prior status, but 11 that will be minimal in nature. 12 THE COURT: When is your plan to turn those over? 13 MR. SINGER: When we receive them from the FBI. 14 THE COURT: When do you anticipate that will be? 15 MR. SINGER: Hopefully today. 16 THE COURT: Very good. Mr. Rittgers, either Mr. Rittgers, any outstanding discovery issues you're aware 17 18 of? 19 MR. C. MATTHEW RITTGERS: Nothing further than what we've briefed, Your Honor. Nothing further than what 20 21 Mr. Singer has already put on the record, I believe. 22 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you, Mr. Rittgers. 23 terms of outstanding motions --24 MR. SINGER: Your Honor, if I may? 25 THE COURT: Yes, Mr. Singer.

MR. SINGER: I was going to address this later, but we might as well address it now since we're talking about the Jencks disclosure statement.

We received information relating to the undercover, which is the subject of a prior motion relating to a protective order, there are allegations of misconduct.

We discussed this on a number of calls. The FBI OPR did an internal investigation relating to the conduct. We've recently disclosed to defense counsel the results of that investigation.

What we did not receive from the FBI was the actual letter of sensor that was the result. We did not receive that. It's the FBI's position that these are internal FBI documents relating to their disciplinary process, and they would not provide them to our office absent a court order.

The government would not object to a court order with regards to the letter that is in the FBI's possession at this time. That would give the government an opportunity to review that and potentially submit it in camera to see if there are any additional equally disclosures that are appropriate as a result of that disclosure.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Singer.

Mr. Rittgers?

MR. C. MATTHEW RITTGERS: Your Honor, we would make a

motion for a court order regarding what Mr. Singer just mentioned.

THE COURT: Yeah. And the Court's going to order the production of that letter. If it needs to be redacted, in your view, Mr. Singer, I would propose that you submit it in camera with proposed redactions, and explanation for any proposed redactions, and then the Court will produce to the other side whatever the Court ends up determining.

MR. SINGER: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Very good. How quickly can you get that to the Court if I get an order out today?

MR. SINGER: If the order's out today, I will send it to the FBI as soon as it's received and, hopefully, we'll receive it by the end of the day, if not by tomorrow.

THE COURT: All right. In terms of pending motions, of which there have been a number of recent filings, I just want to make sure that I've got all of this listed.

I think there's defendant's third motion to compel, which is Document 99. Well, I think we've discussed that previously, and I think I've said what I'm going to say on that.

MR. SINGER: I believe the Court ruled on that at the last status conference.

THE COURT: Mr. Rittgers, would you agree with that?

MR. C. MATTHEW RITTGERS: I would agree, Your Honor.

THE COURT: So I would move that one out. Well, move it beyond what I've already said about it at the last status conference.

There's the government's motion to preclude testimony,

Document 100, with accompanying briefing. There's defendant's

motion to exclude proffered 404(b) evidence, which is

Doc. 111.

I'd like to talk about where we are on the status of briefing. On all of these, I noticed there are oppositions to some, so I'm wondering whether there's going to be replies or not, or whether they're fully briefed.

So let me go through the list first, and then we can go back and talk about each.

Government's motion in limine to preclude argument and evidence supporting jury nullification, which is Doc. 113; defendant's motion to exclude testimony of J.K., which is Doc. 115; defendant's motion to enforce the rule of completeness and Federal Rule of Evidence 106, which is Doc. 120; defendant's amended motion to enforce the rule of completeness and Federal Rule of Evidence 106, which is Doc. 121, which I believe supersedes this Document 120, is that correct, Mr. Singer?

MR. SINGER: That's correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. So I have those five motions as the motions that still require rulings. Is that the

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complete list, Mr. Singer?
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               MR. SINGER: Yes, Your Honor.
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               THE COURT: Mr. Rittgers?
               MR. C. MATTHEW RITTGERS: I believe so, Your Honor.
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               THE COURT: Okay. And in terms of where we're at in
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      briefing, I believe I've received the reply on the Doc. 100 of
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      the government's motion to preclude testimony.
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           With regard to the other ones -- well, what's your view
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      on where we're at on briefing on defendant's motion to exclude
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      proffered 404(b) evidence, Mr. Rittgers?
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               MR. C. MATTHEW RITTGERS: Your Honor, I believe that
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      the government has filed a response on that motion, and we do
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      plan to file --
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               THE COURT: I thought you filed -- have you not
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      responded to that, Mr. Singer?
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               MR. SINGER: Your Honor, we have not yet responded to
      the motion to exclude the 404(b) evidence.
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                THE COURT: Okay. I thought you had as well. When
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      are you going to have a response on that, Mr. Singer?
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               MR. SINGER: One moment, Your Honor?
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               THE COURT: Yes. It's the J.K. one, Mr. Rittgers, if
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      that --
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               MR. SINGER: Yes, we have filed a response for J.K.
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      We had anticipated responding to that motion next Monday,
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      Your Honor.
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THE COURT: Next Monday, all right. 1 2 If the government's opposition is in by Monday, 3 Mr. Rittgers, when do you anticipate filing your reply? MR. C. MATTHEW RITTGERS: Your Honor, are we 4 5 referring to Monday, June 6? 6 THE COURT: I think that's what we're referring to, 7 isn't that right, Mr. Singer? 8 MR. SINGER: Yes, Your Honor. 9 MR. C. MATTHEW RITTGERS: Your Honor, I believe we 10 can file a reply by Monday, June 13th. 11 THE COURT: Any chance you can do it by Friday? 12 MR. C. MATTHEW RITTGERS: We will do our best. On 13 the 404(b) motion, we were not put on notice for the 14 particular subsection that the government intends to admit 15 this evidence, so we are anxious to hear their response so we 16 can reply. Yes, we will try to get it to you by June 11th, 17 Your Honor. 18 THE COURT: Okay. 19 COURTROOM DEPUTY: June 10th, Judge. 20 THE COURT: The 10th. 21 MR. C. MATTHEW RITTGERS: The 10th. Sorry. Thank 22 you. 23 THE COURT: Where are we on the government's motion 24 in limine to preclude argument and evidence supporting jury 25 nullification? I don't believe there's an opposition, but I

1 could be wrong. 2 MR. C. MATTHEW RITTGERS: There has not been a 3 response, Your Honor. We will file -- we intend to file a very brief response to that. 4 5 THE COURT: Okay. Essentially saying you're not 6 going to be arguing for jury nullification? 7 MR. C. MATTHEW RITTGERS: You're correct. 8 THE COURT: That's what I was hoping that was going 9 to be. All right. 10 Defendant's motion to exclude testimony of J.K., there has been an opposition filed. When do you anticipate having a 11 12 reply on that, Mr. Rittgers? MR. C. MATTHEW RITTGERS: Your Honor, two attorneys 13 have been out of the office for a while. If we could have 14 15 Monday, June 13th, for that. THE COURT: June 13th? 16 17 MR. C. MATTHEW RITTGERS: I'm sorry. June 6th. 18 apologize. 19 THE COURT: Yes. That would be fine. Defendant's 20 motion to enforce the rule of completeness of Federal Rule of Evidence 106 -- well, the amended one one was filed yesterday. 21 22 MR. SINGER: Yes, Your Honor. I believe we could 23 have a response to that by Monday, June 6th. 24 THE COURT: Okay. Are you intending to file a reply, 25 Mr. Rittgers?

MR. C. MATTHEW RITTGERS: Yes, Your Honor. 1 2 THE COURT: So the one that's fully briefed, I 3 believe, is the motion with regard to the experts; is that right? 4 5 MR. SINGER: Yes, Your Honor. 6 THE COURT: So I'm concerned about that, 7 Mr. Rittgers. I'm not sure that I've got enough information 8 about what these experts intend to testify to to perform my gatekeeper function under Daubert and make an assessment 9 10 either about reliability or about relevance. 11 So it seems to me that there's a couple different ways we 12 could go about it, but I'm going to want to hear about what 13 the alleged -- what the proper opinions are going to be before 14 we're going to put it in front of a jury. 15 So we could take a break during the trial, voir dire the expert then and make a determination. But if you'd rather 16 have the determination in advance of trial, I would suggest we 17 get these experts in here next week and do a Daubert hearing 18 19 and hear what they have to say. 20 I understand that part of their opinion may be based on 21 evidence that gets elicited at trial, so it may be a little 22 harder to do it advance.

But from a planning standpoint, I can certainly

understand why you would want to have some guidance from the

Court coming in, so I'm going to leave it up to you about how

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you would like to proceed. But I'm not going to make my question determinations with the jury sitting there and having to deal with objections without having some sense of where the things are going, so...

MR. C. MATTHEW RITTGERS: Your Honor, could we have 24 hours just to think about this regarding whether or not it would be taking a break during the jury trial and bringing the expert in next week?

THE COURT: Sure. Yes.

MR. C. MATTHEW RITTGERS: Thank you.

THE COURT: And I can give you some broad outlines. I mean, I'm struggling a little bit on this whole campaign finance expert, what his role's going to be, why -- it's not so much a reliability concern with regard to him as it is a relevance concern.

I don't think your client is, as far as I understand it, is asserting through a violated campaign finance law, so I'm not sure why an explanation of campaign finance law would be relevant to any issue before the jury.

And before you answer that, I know that another concern that you've raised is that certain statements made in connection with the announcement of the indictment, however long ago, were in some way indicative of potential misunderstanding of campaign finance laws.

But the press release surrounding the indictment, and the

press meeting surrounding the indictment, aren't going to be issued before the jury, so I don't see any point in trying to correct any potential misstatements that may have occurred during that press hearing.

So I'm just really struggling. If the answer is, well, if the government's going to try to make something out of the fact that these contributions went to a leadership PAC rather than to a campaign fund, and they're going to try and suggest there was something untoward about that, and the inference should then thus be that your client had a guilty mens rea because he was trying to hide it by chipping at funds to here rather than there, and you want to come in and explain why there's nothing untoward about the way in which that was done, I guess I understand that.

But I don't have any reason, as I sit here now, to anticipate that the government's going to be trying to create an inference with the jury surrounding the way in which the campaign funds were received.

So that's sort of the nature of my confusion around that.

Does that make sense, Mr. Rittgers?

MR. C. MATTHEW RITTGERS: It does, Your Honor. Do you want me to respond, or --

THE COURT: I would love to hear a response to that.

MR. C. MATTHEW RITTGERS: We anticipate that the government will show video and introduce wire audio recordings

where they are -- where they're portraying Mr. Sittenfeld personally accepting a check from the undercover agents.

They will show audio and video where Mr. Sittenfeld says, well, this is a PAC that nobody really knows about. The press isn't getting in and looking at the donations. This is a PAC that my name's not associated with on FEC filings.

The government will elicit testimony into evidence indicating that Mr. Sittenfeld talked about specific or general policy positions at the same time that a discussion about fundraising was occurring.

They're going to elicit testimony and evidence about bundling, where an individual goes out to his or her network and gets a bunch of checks for an elected official or candidate, and says I fundraised \$10,000 for you. That's their whole predication in this particular case in making Mr. Sittenfeld a target.

They're going to elicit -- I've got a list of 10 to 20 things similar to what I've just told Your Honor, and they won't need to expressly say to the jury that that is illegal or unethical.

Well, by the mere fact that they are introducing those things that a layperson might think is nefarious, especially with the atmosphere that they created in this undercover sting operation, I think that -- I mean, in one of the most recent filings, they said that they have, I believe, implied that

they're going to bring in evidence that Mr. Sittenfeld didn't accurately report a gift, a baby gift, that he had received from the undercover agent. That's an FEC violation.

MR. C. HENRY RITTGERS: It's not.

MR. C. MATTHEW RITTGERS: It is not an FEC violation.

My dad is correct. It's even confusing for me at times,

Your Honor.

I believe that -- and this is a non-express- -- I know
I'm not saying anything you don't know, Your Honor, this is a
non-express allegation without a plus factor.

And the government is attempting to have a group of
12 lay people determine a man's intent by showing them
atmospherics, and then preventing us from telling the
12 people, who have no idea how campaign finance works, that
all the things that occur are actually legal and ethical.

And it does not go directly to whether or not a bribe —
that there was a meeting of the minds under contract law, but
that in order to determine a man's intent, they are — a jury
is going to look at all of the context surrounding this and
have a lot of questions about are you permitted to personally
solicit someone for a campaign donation or a PAC donation on a
leadership PAC? Are you permitted to put your name on an FEC
filing? Are you permitted to control that PAC?

And I think most people will think, because we hear about dark money PACs, they're going to think, well, he screwed up.

He should not have done that and, therefore, we will then imply later that if he's dirty there, untoward, or unethical there, then he must be unethical, and he must have really agreed to a bribe on this non-express case.

THE COURT: But that would get into my other concern about that testimony, which is -- start with the last part of what you just said, which is you would like this expert to instruct the jury with regard to the law of campaign finance.

I guess my concern on that front is, you know, generally in trial there's one person who fills the role of informing the jury of what the relevance was, and that's usually a judge, it's not an expert witness.

And you just suggested that you intend to elicit a lot of testimony about what is or is not allowed by FEC law and regs. I mean, isn't that something that should be addressed by the judge rather than by an expert witness?

MR. C. MATTHEW RITTGERS: If Your Honor could give them the instructions, preliminary and final instructions, indicating that some of the things that I just mentioned, we have a list of 10 to 20, are all permissible.

The issue -- and I probably misspoke slightly. There's not a specific FEC regulation or ethics law that will say he -- Mr. Burns is not planning to testify to a specific law because the law is, but the law doesn't expressly say that a candidate can virtually solicit a campaign check. There's

nothing in the law that expressly says that.

There's a body of regulation that precludes candidates from doing certain things, and where there are omissions, it is practice and the standard that it is permissible.

And Mr. Burns is a --

THE COURT: That's right. Now you've gotten into the other area where I'm concerned, which is -- I mean, imagine if your client were -- the government was prosecuting your client for speeding from Cincinnati to Dayton on 75, right?

And you wanted to bring in an expert. And your expert was a highway patrol officer, says I patrolled that highway for 20 years, and I'll tell you anything less than five miles an hour over, they just don't pull people over. And your client was going two miles an hour over and says, that's exactly my point, right?

That doesn't -- I'm not sure that an expert could testify as to custom and practice, or if you brought in -- you know, if that same patrol officer said, yeah, I spent days and days and days out there. I'll tell you every day, 98 percent of the people who come by are going five miles an hour over. So what?

I mean, that doesn't change whether or not your client was speeding, right? I mean, it may give you a basis for a selective prosecution claim, but that's not a claim for the jury.

So I'm just trying to figure out the custom and practice part, and how you intend to elicit relevant evidence with regard to custom and practice, because if it isn't clearly legal, right, the fact that a whole bunch of people are doing it doesn't necessarily change the legality.

MR. C. MATTHEW RITTGERS: But, Your Honor, based on ethics opinions, United States Supreme Court opinions, it is legal. There's just not a particular law in the FEC guidelines where Mr. Burns is going to say here's the subsection that indicates you can personally solicit campaign funds.

THE COURT: Okay. So he's going to, sort of -- I think I'm back to my original trauma, where he's going to read a bunch of court opinions, and synthesize them, and say my understanding of the law as an expert in this field is that the law allows A, B, and C. But then I get back to my concern about that should be the judge, not an expert witness. You see, I'm kind of stuck between these things.

MR. C. MATTHEW RITTGERS: I understand. This case, or most of the reported cases here, or all of the reported cases that we're aware of, there are express agreements.

And so therefore, when you have an express agreement, there's not this concern that a juror is going to draw an incorrect inference from something related to campaign finance.

But this case is all about context. And I don't know how else the jury is going to understand the context from things that we started talking about without somebody -- and whether it's you, Your Honor, or an expert instructing them that there's nothing that prohibits a candidate from personally accepting a check, there's nothing that prohibits a candidate from operating, in fact, he has to.

That is one area of law that is clear in the FEC. He has to control it. It's his leadership PAC and -- while at the same time he can't put his name on it. And these jurors are going to have questions as to whether or not it was operated properly.

THE COURT: Well, let me ask it this way, and maybe this brings Mr. Singer into the conversation.

Are the legal points that Mr. Rittgers is concerned about, are they undisputed? I mean, do you agree with, for example, the leadership PAC can't have Mr. Sittenfeld's name on it, and yet the leadership PAC needs to be controlled by Mr. Sittenfeld, and there's nothing improper about Mr. Sittenfeld accepting checks that are to be directed towards the leadership PAC? Are those all propositions to which the government agrees?

MR. SINGER: Your Honor, I can't sit here and say that I'm versed on the intricacies of FEC law. It's not relevant to what the jury is going to be instructed to do

here.

The issue is, so is there some regulation that discusses whether or not someone can have their name on the PAC and still control it? I don't know. Sitting here, I don't know. And I don't know how that's relevant either.

What's relevant is, in recorded statements that will be put before the jury, the defendant said, "This is my PAC. It benefits me."

THE COURT: I don't think Mr. Rittgers is disputing that the payment of the money to the PAC, that Mr. Sittenfeld would have understood that to be a benefit. Am I wrong, Mr. Rittgers?

MR. C. MATTHEW RITTGERS: You're correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: So they're not disputing that. Their concern is that the government is going to portray this as some kind of slight of hand in the way that the money was funneled, and even just using the word "funneled" has some connotation associated with it.

But that either directly or indirectly, you're going to rely on something about the structuring to create an implication of guilt that's not actually supported by the fact, if people understand campaign finance law, which I certainly agree, you know, the jury and lay juries are unlikely to. And, in fact, I would be the first to admit that I don't know the intricacies of campaign financing laws, as I

sit here today.

So I understand the concern that Mr. Rittgers is raising, that it would be inappropriate for the jury to draw some inference of mal-intent from what appears to be, in some way, shady structuring when, in fact, it isn't shady structuring.

And I don't think it's fair to Mr. Sittenfeld to have the jury be in a situation of sitting there thinking, oh, I've heard about PACs, so PACs are bad things, ergo, this was a bad thing, right? I mean, the government doesn't believe that's fair either, I don't think.

MR. SINGER: The government is not going to present that evidence or argument. But the intent is going to be based on recordings, the defendant's statements in the recordings, the context that's created through those recordings.

THE COURT: I completely understand, Mr. Singer, but I do take Mr. Rittgers' point that somehow, either through the Court or through somebody who can testify as to the ins and outs of campaign finance law, if these things are, in fact, entirely appropriate and legal, I agree the word "PAC" in today's environment has some connotations associated with it.

And I don't think it's appropriate for those connotations to go un-commented upon by anybody, and then potentially create a false implication of guilty mens rea based on somebody's belief that, oh, PACs are inherently bad and this

must have been illegal. I mean --

MR. SINGER: Your Honor, I think that the government's proposed jury instruction say that, that the defendant is allowed to receive, under the First Amendment, PAC checks and campaign contributions. That's permissible. That's in our proposed jury instructions. What the defendant is not allowed to do is accept it in exchange --

THE COURT: Quid pro quo.

MR. SINGER: Quid pro quo. And that's the law. And we have stipulated that that is an instruction that will be appropriate for the jury, but the intricacies, the ins and outs of regulations surrounding campaign finance law and FEC law is a sideshow.

THE COURT: I understand that, but I do think -- here's what I would suggest that the parties attempt to do.

If the parties can come up with some agreed preliminary instruction that the Court can give the jury about the appropriateness of having the leadership PAC, the appropriateness of not having the defendant's name associated with that PAC, the appropriateness of receiving checks, all those things that Mr. Rittgers, I think is, in my view, appropriately concerned about.

If we can have preliminary instructions to the jury so that -- my other fear is they hear all this evidence, they start forming opinions, and they get to the end of the trial,

and then they get these jury instructions that say, oh, everything that you might think about PACs or have thought about PACs in real life, it turns out isn't the problem here. That may be too late.

So I'm either going to allow -- somebody is going to give the jury some insight about whether or not this is -- whether there's anything inappropriate about the structuring here.

And I completely get your point, Mr. Singer, and the argument the government's going to make about the quid pro quo.

And I agree with you, but I just don't want a jury thinking there's something off about this structuring if, in fact, everybody at both those tables agrees that there isn't anything illegal or illicit or unethical about this structuring here. Does that make sense?

MR. SINGER: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And if the parties can come up with agreed preliminary instructions, I'd be glad to give them, otherwise, I'm going to be sort of inclined to allow at least some testimony around that topic.

Now, I'm not inclined to allow testimony around the topics of things like, for example, somebody coming in and saying, oh, I've worked with campaigns for 20 years, or I've worked with politicians for 20 years, and this is typical of the way they interact with donors.

We're not doing that because that's, A, in my view, unreliable, unless you can tie it to something more; and, B, it's getting awfully close to instructing a jury on intent, which isn't permissible under 704, so there's limits here.

I mean, we're not going to have somebody come in and sort of wave the magic wand of expert and bless everything that went on. But if there are things that are clearly legal, that may have, in the jury's -- a lay jury's mind, implications that deal with the outing, I don't want that shadowing deliberations in this case, okay? Does that make sense?

MR. SINGER: Understood.

THE COURT: All right. Now, I'm also, even though it's not fully briefed, in the interest of trying to move this along a little bit, I want to talk a little bit about the motion to enforce the rule of completeness.

And I think what we need to do on that -- and I'm certainly willing to hear the government's response on this motion. But I'm a little concerned about the motion up front, so I might as well just lay out my concerns, and then we can talk about what we're going to do.

The rule of completeness -- and I don't even know where the government pointed this out. It might have been in the objections to the jury instructions. But the rule of completeness doesn't make inadmissible hearsay admissible.

I mean, there's about 10 million Sixth Circuit cases that

say that, some of which even say, even though this seems unfair, this is the rule. But that being said, not every out-of-court statement is hearsay.

And my concern here is that some of the out-of-court statements that Mr. Sittenfeld may or may not have made in the parts of the recordings that the government doesn't intend to play, you know, aren't hearsay. They may be for the impact on the listener, for example, and so I can give an easy example.

If Mr. Sittenfeld -- and I want to be clear to everyone in the courtroom. I have no reason to believe these are the facts of this case. This is a hypothetical.

But if Mr. Sittenfeld were sitting at a table and said, look, I can't do anything -- I can't make any promises. I can't do anything that would violate campaign law. I want to be very clear. For example, I can't sit here today and say if you give me this amount of money, I'm going to get these votes. I can't do that.

And then the government wants to come in and clip the beginning and the end, just put the part on that says if you give me the money, I'll get the votes, that would be completely contrary to the actual intent of the conversation.

And so if the question is what was the impact of that intermediate part on the listener, you can't know without having that entire exchange.

So that wouldn't be a hearsay statement, nor would it be

exculpatory. It would be for the impact on the listener of the entire context of the communication.

And I think, under the rule of completeness, that would be allowable because it's not bringing in an exculpatory statement, it's just providing context for the part that was played.

Now, having said that, Mr. Rittgers, I am not of the view that in a multi-month investigation, that the rule is going to be if the government wants to use two minutes of audio, that means that 20 hours of audio need to be played.

So if there are specific additional parts that you believe, Mr. Rittgers, are not hearsay, and are needed to put something that the government intends to play in context for, for example, the impact on a listener, I'm willing to entertain that.

But there's no way I'm going to say that there's a rule that if the government, in a criminal prosecution, uses some small portion of audio or video recordings, that means that under some notion of completeness, the entirety of them needs to be played. You're going to need to tie it to specific parts that you think need to be placed in context.

And I want to also be very clear that there's a whole bunch of Sixth Circuit case law that I started with, that if you're intending to use the additional parts for the truth of the matter asserted, that's not allowable.

So, for example, I think one of the Sixth Circuit cases involves somebody who says something about, yeah, that was my gun that was used in the murder. And then at some other point during the interview with police officers said, but I sold it three months before the crime happened, you don't get to bring in the "but I sold it three months before it happened" part because that's an attempt to bring in hearsay. There you're using it for the truth of the matter asserted.

So my only point is all of this stuff is very contextual and very much specific to the nature of the additional parts that you want to bring in.

If it's an exculpatory hearsay statement, it's not coming in. But if it's being offered, as I said, for impact on the listener as some other permissible use, that's an exception to the hearsay rule generally, I'll at least hear what you have to say on that.

Do you understand what I'm saying, Mr. Rittgers?

MR. C. MATTHEW RITTGERS: I do, Your Honor. The only thing that I can think of that would be an express exculpatory statement is in like a three-minute call that they'd have to clip out the middle of, so I don't think we have that concern.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, and I don't know that you guys are going to get to an agreement on this, I'm not suggesting that. But I'm not going to have the jury listen to 20 hours of unstructured audio recordings of a whole bunch of

separate meetings. I'm not doing that, so ... 1 But I understand your concern, and I'm willing to try and 2 3 work with you if there are specific things, like the example 4 that I just gave. 5 And maybe the parties can work together and see if 6 there's -- in light of what I just said, if there's some kind 7 of agreement they can come to on that. 8 And I also want to be clear, this isn't -- A, no rulings 9 on motions in limine are final, and my preliminary rulings, we 10 have to wait and see what happens at trial. But, B, this is 11 just based on what I've gotten looking at your motion and the 12 concerns I have about it, and without the benefit of the 13 government's response. 14 Although, I think -- is it in the objection to the --15 someone from the government laid out Sixth Circuit case law 16 that the rule of completeness does not trump the hearsay rule. 17 I can't remember where that was, or maybe you didn't. Maybe I 18 just found that on my own. 19 MR. SINGER: Your Honor? 20 THE COURT: Yes. Go ahead. 21 MR. SINGER: I didn't mean to interrupt, if you were 22 done? 23 THE COURT: No. You're good. 24 MR. SINGER: I was going to address the rule of

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completeness motion.

1 THE COURT: Yes. 2 MR. SINGER: I think the government would agree with 3 everything that you said. That leaves us in the position of should we respond to the motion as it's filed, or are you 4 5 seeking more from the defense, and then --6 THE COURT: No. 7 MR. SINGER: -- we would respond to that? 8 THE COURT: If you're comfortable with what I just --9 that's my ruling, based on their motion without the benefit of 10 your response. So I doubt your response would make it worse 11 for you. I can't really imagine how that could be. 12 So if you're comfortable with that, that's what I meant, 13 you don't need to respond. 14 MR. SINGER: Okay. 15 THE COURT: Now, I guess if Mr. Rittgers has heard 16 something that I've said that he wants to reply to, I think he 17 If you're not going to file a response, I don't mean 18 to, you know, prevent him from putting in further 19 argumentation in response to what I just said, but you don't 20 need to respond if you're comfortable with what I just said. 21 MR. SINGER: We will assess whether or not a response 22 is appropriate, based on the Court's comments. 23 THE COURT: Very good. 24 MR. C. MATTHEW RITTGERS: Your Honor, my father had a 25 question.

1 THE COURT: Yes. 2 MR. C. MATTHEW RITTGERS: Based on what you 3 indicated --THE COURT: And you can both -- feel free, 4 5 Mr. Rittgers, Senior. 6 MR. C. HENRY RITTGERS: Thank you, Your Honor. 7 regard to being a little more explicit as to those portions 8 that should be played in order to give them context, do you 9 want those now ahead of trial so that you can see what we are 10 worried about and what we would want played? 11 THE COURT: I think it would be helpful to the 12 progress of the trial. Are there transcripts of all these 13 things? 14 MR. C. MATTHEW RITTGERS: No, Your Honor. There are 15 a number of FBI transcripts that are official, but not all 16 recordings are transcribed. THE COURT: And nobody has made even informal 17 18 transcriptions of them? 19 MR. C. MATTHEW RITTGERS: We have them informal, yes, 20 Your Honor. 21 THE COURT: But you don't want to share that with the 22 government? 23 MR. C. MATTHEW RITTGERS: Well, I mean, they're truly 24 informal. They're like an email, listening and typing. It's 25 not even with a court reporter, Your Honor. I'm fine sharing

it. It's what the audio says.

THE COURT: I mean, to the extent we all understand they're not official transcripts, it may be easier for me to review if I had, like, in yellow is the part the government wants to play, and in green is the part we propose adding, or something like that. Even if it's in an unofficial transcript, it would be a lot easier than sitting and listening to audiotapes would be my only thing.

MR. SINGER: Your Honor, if I may?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. SINGER: We have reached out to a court reporting service, and -- after hearing that the defendant had intended to put in a lot of statements outside of what we consider to be super relevant statements that we had already transcribed.

So we have a number of additional transcriptions that we are finalizing. They're informal as of now, but we are going to be, obviously, providing them to defense counsel, and that might help move this process along, having those transcripts available.

THE COURT: Mr. Rittgers?

MR. C. MATTHEW RITTGERS: That would be wonderful, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. So if the parties can submit in advance of trial, you know, Mr. Rittgers, what he's proposed adding.

And I understand that we may not be at a hundred percent on knowing for sure what the government's putting on in its case in chief, so I'm not suggesting this would necessarily be bulletproof, but at least it will give me a chance to look at it in advance of trial.

Anything we can do in advance of trial, I think, will benefit all of the parties, in terms of keeping this trial moving along in as seamless a fashion as it can. So that is where I was on that one.

It sounds like, Mr. Rittgers, I could make you the same offer with regard to setting a time limit with regard to opposition, so let me tell you where I'm at on jury nullification that I'm not going to allow.

I'm certainly not going to have an instruction on jury nullification, and I don't intend to allow the parties to argue for hearing nullification.

MR. C. MATTHEW RITTGERS: We might not file a response, You Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. C. MATTHEW RITTGERS: I mean, we weren't planning on arguing the response.

THE COURT: Okay. So my preliminary ruling is I would grant -- but, yes, go ahead.

MS. GLATFELTER: Your Honor, I have concern because some of the arguments that are in the government's motion to

prevent jury nullification are echoed throughout separate motions.

So while defendants somehow profess they're not intending to elicit argument about these things, as an example, one of our topics in the motion was it's not a defense that everyone else was doing it or this is just how things work. We've heard that today. We've heard that in the expert response. So I would ask for a ruling on it.

THE COURT: Okay. I am happy to rule on it because I agree, "this is the way it works" is not a defense to this charge.

I thought I understood Mr. Rittgers to be acquiescing in that, but maybe I misunderstood.

MR. C. MATTHEW RITTGERS: Your Honor, absolutely agree. But definitely in terms of Mr. Burns, just to put another wrinkle in while we're all here.

The J.K. motion, as an example, just so that we can put that before the Court. If they put someone like J.K. on to talk about, well, this is what -- well, this individual works for collectivists all over, advice being relied on, on cross-examination, I don't know what the government thinks to elicit as testimony, but it could open the door for that.

THE COURT: I would agree with that. You know, in terms of J.K. -- defendant's motion to exclude -- which is the one that talks about the other people, is that the 404(b) one

or is that the J.K. one?

MR. C. MATTHEW RITTGERS: Other people in terms of?

THE COURT: The other, what's being called character evidence. That was, I think, the 404(b) motion, right?

MR. C. MATTHEW RITTGERS: Probably, yes.

THE COURT: Yeah. I don't want to get ahead of myself on too much of this stuff, although I will say with regard to the 404(b) stuff, you know, we're not going to trot a bunch of witnesses up to say things like, I don't know, he didn't really say anything, but I sort of felt, I was getting this sense that... you know, we're not doing that.

If there's other examples of similar conduct to what's alleged in this case involving specific official acts and campaign contributions tied to those specific official acts, that's one thing, but we're not putting people on the stand to say they subjectively felt like, I don't know, it was just in the air. We're not doing that. That's not fair.

So when I went through some of the examples in the 404(b), some of them certainly seem to fall, at least in my view, based on the description that was provided within the latter category of, I don't know, it was just kind of an atmospheric, or something along those lines, you know, that isn't going to fly.

But that's just kind generally where I'm at. And I will give written rulings on those things, but I'm just trying to

give you as much heads up as I can on how to prepare for trial.

The government, you know, J.K., or with regard to -- I do agree that on the 404(b), that to the extent that it's all part of the same general alleged series of events, it's not even technically 404(b) because it's not other acts. It's part of the same scheme or plan or -- alleged. I want to be very clear, alleged scheme or plan.

So if it's all within connection with the same general time frame, the same campaign, the same whatever, you know, I don't think that's 404(b). I think that's unindicted conduct.

I think the question's going to be asked about why it's unindicted, but -- separate issue, but it's unindicted conduct involving the same general plan or scheme, and so I would not call that 404(b), just so we're clear.

Mr. Rittgers, am I drawing lines that you're following?

I'm not asking whether you agree with them, but am I drawing lines you're following?

MR. C. MATTHEW RITTGERS: Yes, Your Honor, I'm following. It goes back to Mr. Burns. In one of the recent filings, which was on Monday or Tuesday of this week, the government mentioned the term that you just said, which was unindicted criminal conduct for soliciting campaign donations from someone that does business in front of the city. It's not even an ethical violation, so why would it be criminal

conduct.

And so the same confusion that, I believe, the government might have, the jurors are going to have that same confusion, without understanding that a person is permitted -- a candidate or an elected official is permitted to throw a fundraiser with a group of industry leaders or lobbyists two days before a vote and change their vote.

And so if the government is saying that this is uncharged criminal conduct, that being an elected official in the City of Cincinnati, they use the word "targeting." Someone who might have business in front of the city, it's not criminal conduct, or an --

THE COURT: I agree. I think, as I've said from the outset of this case, the difficulty is that candidates raise money from people who may have subsequent business in front of the office to which the candidate is seeking to be elected, and there is nothing wrong or unethical about that.

It only becomes wrong or unethical if there's an agreement, either expressly written down or tacitly arranged through the phrase that, I think, Judge Easterbrook used was "winks and nods," that there is an agreement in place that the official will undertake some specific official action in exchange for that campaign contribution.

And so the difficult task the jury is going to face in this case is trying to assess whether this is just someone who

gave money in hopes that someone would get elected to office and, generally, looked favorably upon that person, or if this is someone who gave money in exchange for your client tacitly agreeing to take some specific act.

And so I certainly do not intend to allow anyone to suggest to the jury that the mere fact of taking or accepting -- I shouldn't say taking, accepting a campaign contribution from someone who has or may have business with the office to which the candidate is seeking to be elected is, in and of itself, in any way unethical, so does that --

MR. C. MATTHEW RITTGERS: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And I recognize that can come up in a variety of different ways, and so, you know, I'm going to be trying to police that line.

And you guys are going to need to help me try to police that line, because I may not be as attuned to the various different ways in which that can come up. But that is a line I very much intend to police, because that's kind of the difficult task we face in this case.

MR. C. MATTHEW RITTGERS: Understood.

THE COURT: All right. So that's generally where I am on these motions, some of which are not fully briefed. And I'm certainly not saying I'm set in stone on anything, other than it sounds like we're generally -- if I could, it sounds to me like we're generally in agreement on the jury

nullification thing, except you said you wanted a ruling, because there's a lot of talk that there's some specific things in there.

The rule of completeness thing, as I understand it, you guys are going to try to take a crack at figuring out what you want to add, and at least put it in front of me before this trial, and I'll make a ruling on that.

The government's motion to preclude expert testimony, you're going to get back to me within 24 hours about whether you want to do a *Daubert* hearing next week, or some kind of voir dire during trial.

The 404(b) thing, I sort of gave you some preliminary thoughts, but I'm happy to write something up if that's better. And the J.K. thing, have I shared my preliminary thoughts on J.K. or not?

MR. C. MATTHEW RITTGERS: I believe tacitly but not expressly.

THE COURT: Well, I think that's a theme for this trial is tacitly not expressly. But yeah, it's sort of where I am on the 404(b) thing.

I don't think there's anything wrong with targeting people who may be inclined to contribute, for various reasons, to campaign contributions; but, you know, I really don't know what the person's going to say, so it's very hard for me to rule in the abstract if --

You know, if somebody were to come in and say -- and, again, for the benefit of everyone in the room, this is not what the evidence says, or at least any evidence I've seen.

But if J.K. were to come in and say, oh, yeah, you know, Mr. Sittenfeld told me to go out and propose these deals to people, we'll do X in exchange for Y, that's different from here are people who may be interested in your campaign because they are people who have business before the city.

And I don't think there's, as far as I know, anything wrong with the latter, but the former would be a violation of the law, so...

It's a little hard in the abstract to say exactly what J.K. is going to say, but if, to the extent the government intends to try to create, sort of, the appearance of misconduct based on the fact that a candidate may think, oh, well, a potentially rich target pool is people who may have business before the city and, therefore, we will take steps to allow you to address any such implications, because I don't think that implication is fair to your client.

MR. C. MATTHEW RITTGERS: Thank you, Your Honor.

Your Honor, I might have misspoke, and I apologize for going back to what Ms. Glatfelter had spoken about with ruling on the nullification motion.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. C. MATTHEW RITTGERS: I think I indicated to the

Court that we are in agreement with all that.

Mr. Sittenfeld just reminded me there might have been a part of that brief that indicated that Mr. Sittenfeld's public pro-development stance was inadmissible, and I might be quoting that incorrectly.

But there was -- in one of the motions, there was a Sixth Circuit pattern jury instruction that indicates that it's not a defense to bribery, that he would have done it without the money.

THE COURT: That is correct.

MR. C. MATTHEW RITTGERS: I agree with that statement. However, on a non-express case, for a jury to have to come to the determination as to why an elected official might want to champion a project, they have to understand the context and other reasons why that elected official would say, you know what, I'll help you because this project is something that I believe in.

And so if, to the extent -- and I might be incorrect, but to the extent in that nullification motion there's some argument or request that we are not permitted to show

Mr. Sittenfeld's public pro-development stance, then we would not agree to that one part, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Yeah. Is that in the jury nullification motion? There's been such a flurry of filings, I'm not completely up to speed on all of them, but...

MR. SINGER: In the trial brief, Your Honor, we said that would be admissible as evidence. It just cannot be argued as a defense. I think that was our position.

THE COURT: Right. And I think I heard Mr. Rittgers agree with that.

Well, since we're kind of powering through some issues, one other issue that came up -- we'll talk about how we're going to do the jury instructions, but one other issue that came up that I want to give my preliminary thoughts on, because I think it may impact the way in which you prepare for trial, is in regard to this good faith defense.

As far as I can tell, and I'm willing to hear more argument on it, there's not a freestanding good faith defense in the sense of, oh, my client's basically a good guy, or my client basically is pro-public, or my client has got Cincinnati's best interest at heart. If that's what you mean by good faith, as far as I know, there isn't such a defense.

The way good faith comes up, and why the Sixth Circuit has said it's not consistent with an intent to defraud, is because of this type of hypothetical, where somebody -- I come to you and I say, hey, I'd like you to invest with me. I've got this great idea. I'm a hundred percent sure we're going to get 20 percent return per year, right?

And if it turns out that I actually believe that, then
I'm not trying to defraud you because I don't have an intent

to defraud. I could be wildly wrong, but if I have a subjective honest belief that we're going to generate 20 percent returns, and I tell you that, that isn't consistent with an intent to defraud.

But here -- so good faith is usually tied to some specific statement, and whether that statement was said or uttered in good faith. And the Sixth Circuit said if it was uttered in good faith, that's not consistent with an attempt to defraud.

But that doesn't mean there's a freestanding good faith, like I wake up with an optimistic view of Cincinnati's going to be a great city, and so as long as I'm just pursuing that, that means however I go about it, it doesn't violate any law.

So there isn't going to be -- and what I need you to explain to me, in the context of this case, if you're seeking a good faith instruction -- I think it's 10.04 or something, but if you're seeking that pattern instruction, I would need to know what statement that good faith is going to attach to.

In other words, what statement somebody is saying was false but you honestly believe was true, and that's what I'm not seeing in this case.

So as I sit here right now, I don't see a basis for a good faith instruction, because I fear that it will be interpreted by the jury as some kind of freestanding if you find this is somebody who is acting with a good heart writ

large, that means you can't convict.

And, again, this isn't the facts of this case, but if the facts showed that, in the interest of Cincinnati and with the hope to make the city better, Mr. Sittenfeld entered an expressed agreement or even a tacit agreement to exchange a specific official act for campaign contributions, the fact that he did so out of the belief that it would ultimately be good for the city isn't a defense to the charges. And so we need to keep those apart.

And so that's where I'm, sort of, at on the good faith question, just so you know.

MR. C. MATTHEW RITTGERS: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And I'm sorry, Mr. Singer, do you have any questions about that, or Ms. Glatfelter?

MS. GLATFELTER: Yes. I had one question about a previous statement you made about the expert issue.

THE COURT: Sure.

MS. GLATFELTER: And so as I understood it, you had asked the government and defense counsel to work together on whether there was a preliminary instruction that could be given to --

THE COURT: Avoid Mr. Burns testifying.

MS. GLATFELTER: And so, in addition to, I guess, they'll be coming back within 24 hours to tell us whether we're going to have a *Daubert* hearing or not --

THE COURT: Right. 1 2 MS. GLATFELTER: -- and at the same time, we'll be 3 working on --Yes. Thank you for bringing that up, 4 THE COURT: 5 because I left Mr. Fitzgerald out. 6 With regard to Mr. Fitzgerald, I've got some -- what I 7 would want to know in a Daubert hearing or voir dire about 8 Mr. Fitzgerald is if he's going to be commenting on 9 investigative techniques, how somebody who, as far as I can 10 tell, you know, had a cup of coffee with the FBI 30 years ago 11 is going to be an expert on investigative techniques that the 12 FBI should use in campaign investigations, I'm struggling a 13 little bit, so... 14 MR. C. MATTHEW RITTGERS: Understood, Your Honor. 15 mean, he was a special case agent for undercover operations, 16 and it was not -- the intent is not going to be to have 17 Mr. Fitzgerald indicate what procedures that might be relevant to this particular sting operation, but more just a general 18

THE COURT: Yeah. I would need somebody to tie up his experience from 30 years ago with it being relevant to today.

characters and education in terms of the control, scripted

calls, that would be the intent, Your Honor.

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And then, B, I would need somebody who could -- he would have to explain to me how he can tie it to the specific

investigation that occurred here. And I think he's going to struggle to do that, to be honest, but that's what I would want to hear about at a hearing with regard to him.

And with regard to these other topics, some of it -- you know, I mean, I think he wanted to talk about -- I don't have the motion, I don't think, in front of me right now, but it was like how people interface with potential donors and campaigns generally, or something like that.

Again, that runs directly into the problem that I've raised already about, even if Mr. Sittenfeld was acting in a manner consistent with the evolved custom of how candidates interface with donors, that doesn't, in my mind, impact the legality or illegality thereof.

In other words, even if 95 percent of the candidates are doing it, that doesn't make 95 percent of candidates are violating the law. I mean, we just don't know, you know.

MR. C. MATTHEW RITTGERS: I agree, Your Honor. I think it depends on how the government elicits testimony and evidence in the case.

We anticipate that one of the themes that the government will argue, probably expressly, is that Mr. Sittenfeld should have known or did know that these undercovers were corrupt, that these actors were corrupt, by pointing to examples in the audio and video indicating, well -- they never stated they're corrupt, but there are times when they say, well, yeah, he's

legitimized himself now. UC3 worked in New Jersey, but he's legitimized himself now.

And there will be evidence presented to where they offer Mr. Sittenfeld money orders, which he declined. There will be evidence presented where they offered Mr. Sittenfeld corporate checks, as opposed to LLC checks.

I believe that the relevance, the proposed relevance for that testimony would be that that must be an indication to Mr. Sittenfeld that these people are, therefore, corrupt.

And it would go to his -- I'm playing the government. So therefore, we wanted somebody, Mr. Fitzgerald or somebody other than Mr. Sittenfeld himself, to say people on the campaign trail offer cash. I've frequently had to tell donors what is legal and permitted and send checks back.

And it's not what the government is hoping the jury will infer from these atmospherics, it is something that happens every day, which is why Mr. Sittenfeld looked optimistically on all of this and did not say, whoa, are you corrupt? I'm not going to deal with you anymore.

THE COURT: I see. And to the extent someone's been involved in campaign finance for an extended period of time, I would imagine that they may have some insights into how often things like we got a check that we have to send back, which happens in political campaigns all the time.

People get checks and realize, for whatever reason, they

can't accept it. It's, as you said, from a corporation, maybe, or whatever, or it can't be directed to this, or it's in excess of the campaign contribution limits or, oh, you forgot you gave this other check, we have to refund part of this.

You know, I understand that. And I think, if there's going to be an attempt to argue that there's something untoward about things like sending back those corporate checks, yeah, I would think that that would open the door for you putting on somebody who could explain that's a pretty common occurrence in political campaigns.

MR. C. MATTHEW RITTGERS: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: So now let's get on to the mundane parts, now that I've pontificated about the law for an extended period of time.

So let's talk about the length of the trial. It's currently set for four weeks, June 21 to July 15. You've heard from the Court today a little bit about my intent, probably, my intent to exclude at least some of the evidence that we've heard about the parties intending to put on, but — and so I don't know if you can take that into account yet.

I understand there may be some streamlining, if we can present some things to the jury through instructions from the Court, and things of that nature.

But what's the current estimate, from the government, as

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to how long it believes its case in chief will last?
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               MR. SINGER: Your Honor, I think the government's
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      position is we think our case will be done in about a week.
               THE COURT: Okay.
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               MR. SINGER: Give or take.
               THE COURT: Mr. Rittgers, do you have any sense of
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      your case?
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               MR. C. MATTHEW RITTGERS: It won't be longer than a
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      week, Your Honor.
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               MR. C. HENRY RITTGERS: But what if it is, Judge?
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      What if it's ten days instead of five days?
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               THE COURT: Well, I'm here every day, and the jury
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      will be here every day, so...
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               MR. C. HENRY RITTGERS: Okay. We just don't want
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      to --
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               THE COURT: No, no. I might as well talk about this
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      now. We have pre-qualified the jury, not with respect to any
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      issue. I took what the parties said about, you know,
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      potential downsize, of trying to pre-screen for people who
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      have had exposure to this case. But we are pre-qualifying
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      that they are all people who could be here four weeks starting
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      June 21st.
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           So I don't believe, given what the parties have just
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      said, that there should be a problem with the jury, or losing
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      jurors after two weeks. We're not going to do that.
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So everybody who comes for the voir dire will have been pre-qualified as somebody who can be in a four-week jury trial starting on June 21st.

Does that respond to your concern, Mr. Rittgers?

MR. C. HENRY RITTGERS: It was just committing to the Court that if we're only going to take five days, and then find out, after the government presents its case, we may need seven.

THE COURT: Sure. I'm not running a stopwatch, or a sundial, or any kind of timer, so...

MR. C. MATTHEW RITTGERS: And, Your Honor, just for the Court, best guess, I think that we would be three days or four days, Your Honor. That's a guess.

THE COURT: Okay. So four weeks may be wildly over estimated. As I said, we will have a pre-qualified jury in that regard, so I don't anticipate a problem.

And I'm not holding anyone -- these are estimates. I'm just trying to, sort of, get a sense.

Currently, we're set to start on June 21st, and that will be voir dire. I anticipate, given the size of the pool, I've asked to have 85 people brought in who are pre-qualified on time but are not pre-qualified on previous exposure to this case.

So there's some potential we'll lose people. There has been some media interest in this case, so I can imagine we

would lose some potential jurors through exposure, or things 1 2 of that nature. 3 That's more than I would typically bring in, but do the parties think that's enough, 85? 4 5 MR. C. MATTHEW RITTGERS: I do, Your Honor. The 6 defense does. 7 MR. SINGER: Yes, Your Honor. 8 COURTROOM DEPUTY: Your Honor, I believe she's 9 calling in 80. 10 THE COURT: I'm sorry, 80, not 85. MR. C. HENRY RITTGERS: Then we're not. 11 12 THE COURT: Now we got a problem, Mr. Rittgers says. 13 So the first days, I anticipate we will start voir dire 14 at 9:30. I would like the attorneys to arrive at 9:00. 15 trial is scheduled for each subsequent day may vary, depending 16 on the Court's schedule but, generally speaking, my experience with juries over the last year is they like to get going, and 17 they like to stay and get testimony done. 18 19 They prefer to have days taken off the end rather than 20 shorter days while they're going, so we're going to try and 21 accommodate that. 22 I would imagine we'll probably start around 9:00 or 9:15 23 most mornings. 24 Whatever time we're starting, I'd like the attorneys in the courtroom 20 minutes before we start. And I will be in 25

before we're going to bring the jury in, and I will ask both sides if there's anything they want to put on the record, or anything we need to discuss. So please be there at least 20 minutes before trial is scheduled to start.

Generally speaking, we take one break in the morning about halfway through, one break in the afternoon. I try to wrap up around 5:00, so what I tell people is about 4:30, start thinking about is this a witness I can get done if we stay until 5:15, maybe we will.

If it's a witness that's going to take until 6:00, where would be a good breaking point for this witness. Or if it's 4:30, and you just got done with somebody, might this be a good time to break. And if you would just want to suggest, you know, Your Honor, this would be a good time to break for the day.

Any time after 4:30, if you hit a spot where you feel like this would be a good breaking point, feel free because, you know, it doesn't make much sense to do another 15 minutes, and then have to essentially repeat it the next day because people have forgotten it overnight.

Usually, there's about an hour lunch break. And I've got a number of things that are scheduled for the lunch breaks, so some of the lunch breaks may end up being more like an hour and 15 or so, just because with a trial this long, you know, there are a number of things that have to be taken care of in

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other cases.
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           Have the parties done their witness list exchange yet? I
 3
      think they're due on the 10th; is that right?
               MR. SINGER: Your Honor, the witnesses are due to the
 4
      Court on the 10th.
 5
 6
               THE COURT: Due to the Court, obviously, right.
 7
      Submitted, I should say. You're giving them to the Court on
 8
      the 10th, right?
 9
               MR. C. HENRY RITTGERS: Ex parte.
10
               THE COURT: Ex parte, you're right. Yes. Are we
      doing separation of witnesses?
11
               MR. C. HENRY RITTGERS: Yes.
12
13
               MR. SINGER: Your Honor, just to be clear, except for
14
      the case agent who will be sitting at counsel table.
15
               THE COURT: You can have one representative at trial,
16
      yes, and that's the case agent.
17
               MR. SINGER: Thank you.
               THE COURT: What's the case agent's name?
18
19
               MR. SINGER: Special Agent Nathan Holbrook.
20
               THE COURT: Has the defense made any decision that
21
      they want to share on whether or not Mr. Sittenfeld is
22
      expected to testify at trial?
23
               MR. C. MATTHEW RITTGERS: We could share ex parte,
24
      Your Honor, is that okay?
25
               THE COURT: Yes.
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MR. C. MATTHEW RITTGERS: What form would you like 1 2 that in, under seal, or just an email to Mr. Lang? 3 THE COURT: Do you want to just come up and do it at sidebar? 4 5 MR. C. MATTHEW RITTGERS: Sure. (This portion of the record was placed under seal by 6 7 order of the Court and filed separately.) 8 THE COURT: In terms of exhibits, are there any 9 issues that we know of relating to admissibility of exhibits 10 or testimony beyond those that have already been briefed? 11 MR. SINGER: No issues with exhibits, Your Honor. We 12 just want to raise, there's been some discussions about 13 motions, we will be filing additional motions. 14 THE COURT: Okay. Great. 15 MR. C. MATTHEW RITTGERS: Your Honor, I have a 16 question about exhibits. 17 THE COURT: Yes. MR. C. MATTHEW RITTGERS: When -- if there is -- I 18 19 think I know the answer, but I just wanted to make sure that 20 I'm aware of the Court's preference. 21 If -- we don't know, obviously, how the government is 22 going to present its case, and so if there are exhibits that 23 we might use to refresh or to impeach on cross, I don't want 24 to overburden everybody with bind ers that might not be 25 necessary. So we have probably 20 times the material that I

1 think would be necessary for cross-examining a particular 2 witness. 3 If it's impeachment or refreshing recollection, it's difficult for us to anticipate without giving the Court 4 literally 2,000 more exhibits. 5 6 Is that something that would be a problem, if we hear 7 testimony from a witness, pull on our computer an impeachment 8 document or a refreshment document that's not on the exhibit 9 list? 10 THE COURT: Mr. Singer? 11 MR. SINGER: I'm thinking it needs to be on the 12 exhibit list, probably printed out so that they can be 13 presented to the witness in hard copy forms rather than 14 bringing up a laptop. 15 THE COURT: Yeah. How are you planning on using it 16 to refresh recollection, Mr. Rittgers? 17 MR. C. MATTHEW RITTGERS: Yeah. That's a good point. If it's to reflect recollection, on the technology in Judge 18 19 Black's courtroom, is there a way for just the witness to see 20 that particular document, no one else, other than the Court? 21 THE COURT: Yes, there is, although not if it 22 involves audio, we found. 23 COURTROOM DEPUTY: Correct. 24 THE COURT: If it's just written, yes. It could be

shown to counsel, the Court, and the witness.

25

MR. C. MATTHEW RITTGERS: I believe that there are -right now we are including in our exhibit list documents that
we've received in discovery from the government, and it is
around 2,000 listed documents in Excel sheets. And some
documents, for example, might be the five- or six-hundred page
document that's now in your chambers, Your Honor, on J.K. So
these are not one-page documents.

I want to try to make the trial as efficient as possible and effective as possible, so the timing and clarity, it might be easier -- I don't know what a witness might say that the government presents.

This is not for our witness on direct. This is only for cross-examination of their witnesses, if it would be potentially easier or more efficient for us to say, okay, instead of providing the Court in advance with 300 potential documents for J.K., as an example, if he testifies to a very narrow scope, we might only need one.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. C. MATTHEW RITTGERS: So I don't know what the Court would prefer in terms of having everything dropped off here in advance.

THE COURT: Generally speaking, the Court does not prefer having a truckload of documents that may or may not end up being used at trial.

MR. C. MATTHEW RITTGERS: Okay.

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MR. C. HENRY RITTGERS: Your Honor, is there an exchange of exhibits prior to trial, or is that ex parte? THE COURT: I thought it was an exchange but, Mr. Singer, is that not right? MR. SINGER: It's our understanding it's ex parte, Your Honor. THE COURT: Okay. MR. C. HENRY RITTGERS: And if I may, Judge? THE COURT: Yes. MR. C. HENRY RITTGERS: As to materials that are used for cross-examination, we will probably show those at the time we're cross-examining the particular witness, not ahead of time? THE COURT: Right. That's what I would anticipate usually the way cross-examination works. Since you've raised refreshing recollection, I'll just share one pet peeve so we can all avoid that. Refreshing recollection does not consist of handing the witness a document, and then asking the witness to read the document into the record, so that's not refreshing recollection. Refreshing your recollection is you hand the witness a document, the witness reads the document, you say does that refresh your recollection, and then the witness testifies without the document, based on his or her now refreshed

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recollection.
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           For some reason, I've seen people do the, okay, well,
      doesn't the document say X? That isn't refreshed
 3
      recollection. That's trying to read the document into the
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 5
      record, so I'd prefer to avoid that.
 6
               All right. How long do you anticipate the opening
 7
      statement is going to be for the government?
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               MR. SINGER: Roughly 45 minutes, Your Honor.
 9
               THE COURT: Okay. Does the defense intend to give
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      their opening statement at the outset, or are they going to
      wait until their case in chief?
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12
               MR. C. MATTHEW RITTGERS: At the outset, Your Honor.
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               THE COURT: How long do you anticipate yours is going
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      to go?
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               MR. C. MATTHEW RITTGERS: Sixty minutes.
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               THE COURT: Are you going to be using, Mr. Singer,
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      audiovisual equipment?
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               MR. SINGER: We may, Your Honor. We have not decided
19
      yet.
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               THE COURT: What about you, Mr. Rittgers?
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               MR. C. MATTHEW RITTGERS: Yes, we intend to,
22
      Your Honor.
23
               THE COURT: I'll have you talk with Scott. I think
24
      somebody's got a time to set up to go look at the
25
      audiovisuals, I believe.
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1 COURTROOM DEPUTY: Yes. We're going to after the 2 hearing, Judge. 3 THE COURT: Be sure you're comfortable with how it's 4 going to work. 5 MR. SINGER: Your Honor, we would also like an 6 opportunity to run through our audiovisuals. Should we 7 coordinate with Scott? 8 COURTROOM DEPUTY: Yes. 9 MR. SINGER: Coordinate with Scott. Great. Thank 10 you. MS. GLATFELTER: Your Honor, on the topic of opening 11 12 statements, we had asked in our trial brief for the parties to exchange, at least in advance, if they're going to use 13 14 exhibits or audio clips, that those be exchanged so that we 15 can raise any objections beforehand, not in front of the jury. 16 THE COURT: Yeah. I think that's a very good idea in 17 this case, since there seems to be some remaining 18 disagreements about the scope of things. Please do exchange 19 any exhibits that you intend to use if you -- in your 20 openings. 21 To the extent -- I guess what I'd say, Mr. Rittgers, is 22 don't over promise on things, like you're going to hear from 23 an expert that says X, Y, Z if we haven't done a Daubert 24 hearing. 25 I just don't want you in a position where you can't

1 deliver, through no fault of your own, but through my fault because I rule on legal issues, so word to the wise. 2 3 MR. C. MATTHEW RITTGERS: Your Honor, on the audio clips and exhibits for opening, sometimes during trial, I'll 4 5 have an exhaustive potential clips, or like a PowerPoint where I can lead things, depending upon the government's opening. 6 7 So could I just have three or four days after they show 8 me what they plan to produce so that I can then coordinate and 9 tell them without overproducing? 10 THE COURT: I think that seems fair to me. 11 Ms. Glatfelter, any objection to that? MS. GLATFELTER: We typically exchange them like the 12 13 day or two before a trial. I mean, I think it's strange for 14 me to give that a week in advance, and then receive theirs, 15 you know, the day before or something. I would --16 THE COURT: I understand. 17 MS. GLATFELTER: -- a simultaneous exchange seems --THE COURT: Well, I take Mr. Rittgers' point that 18 19 he's responding to your opening. 20 MS. GLATFELTER: Sure. And if he has additional 21 ones, or something like that, we can --22 THE COURT: I'll tell you what. Why don't you 23 produce yours at least three days before trial, Mr. Rittgers, 24 you produce yours. I think you should have a pretty good 25 sense of where the government 's going to go through opening,

so 24 hours to kind of figure out what you're going to do, all right?

And I know we've discussed some potential stipulations.

I don't know if they're actually stipulations, but talk about some preliminary instructions.

Let me ask, are there going to be any stipulations in this case, Mr. Singer?

MR. SINGER: Yes, there are, Your Honor. The parties need to get going on negotiations, as far as that goes. The government will take the blame as far as moving forward, but there is one stipulation we have come to, the authenticity of evidence that has been produced.

THE COURT: I think I saw that.

MR. SINGER: But otherwise, we would be negotiating and, hopefully, we'll get those to you in advance of trial.

THE COURT: "Hopefully, we'll get those to you"?

MR. SINGER: No. We will definitely get them to you in advance of trial, sufficiently in advance of trial, where if you're able to raise any concerns, although I don't think you will.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Rittgers, your thoughts?

MR. C. MATTHEW RITTGERS: Your Honor, we did send

over a number of stipulations, fairly rough stipulations, but

a number of them. A lot of them would be very similar to the

requested preliminary jury instructions regarding the -- a

while ago.

Again, I know Mr. Singer's took credit for not -- there's no negotiation, but a lot of it has to do with that, so we are waiting to hear.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. C. HENRY RITTGERS: Judge?

THE COURT: Yes. Go ahead, Mr. Rittgers.

MR. C. HENRY RITTGERS: Maybe if we could have a date certain by the time for which we all agree as to what the stipulations would be would be great, maybe a week before trial or something?

THE COURT: Yeah, that would be the 14th, I think. Why don't we say June 14th submit stipulations. I think that's a good idea.

MR. C. HENRY RITTGERS: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: In terms of the stipulations themselves, each stipulation should be a separate pleading. You know, we stipulate the following, and then we have one fact, and each one's a separate one.

The reason I want to do them separately is because, during trial, to the extent there's a stipulation, somebody's going to need to remind me to read it to the jury at the appropriate time, so if you'd say, oh, we'd like the stipulation read. You can also make use of the stipulation during closings, and so it's just a matter if each one is on a

separate piece of paper. 1 2 If you, at the end, want to amalgamate some for a 3 demonstrative part of your closing, that's fine. With stipulated evidence, I don't have a problem with that, but we 4 5 need the granularity up front. 6 Jencks material, it sounds like, has largely been 7 produced, but there's some limited amount that's still 8 outstanding. Is that right, Mr. Singer? 9 MR. SINGER: That is correct, Your Honor. 10 THE COURT: And you're producing that on a regular basis as it comes in? 11 12 MR. SINGER: Yes. 13 THE COURT: Mr. Rittgers, any comment on that? 14 MR. C. MATTHEW RITTGERS: No, Your Honor. 15 THE COURT: I assume there's no more remaining Brady 16 issues, Mr. Singer? 17 MR. SINGER: Not from the government's perspective, Your Honor. If I may, Your Honor? 18 19 THE COURT: You may. 20 MR. SINGER: We do have the ex parte that we will be 21 submitting. It's narrower in scope than potentially we had 22 initially thought, but we will be submitting that to the Court 23 within the next day or so. 24 THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Rittgers? 25 MR. C. HENRY RITTGERS: Judge, what was Mr. Singer

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saying, he's going to file an ex parte communication to the
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      Court?
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               THE COURT: Yeah, for --
               MR. C. HENRY RITTGERS: I know it's accepted in
 4
      federal court, but aren't they going to give us a basis as to
 5
 6
      why it's ex parte?
 7
               THE COURT: I think that was the motion they filed
 8
      that I ruled on that said that they could submit something
 9
      ex parte. Am I wrong, Mr. Singer?
10
               MR. SINGER: No. That's correct, Your Honor.
11
               THE COURT: So I ruled on that, and said if the
      government has a -- if the government, in good faith, can't
12
13
      make a determination as to whether or not something
14
      constitutes Brady, that they can submit it to the Court for
15
      determination.
16
               MR. C. HENRY RITTGERS: Oh, we're just talking about
17
      ex parte communication about Brady?
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               THE COURT: Yes.
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               MR. C. HENRY RITTGERS: I apologize. I
20
      misunderstood.
21
               THE COURT: No. We're not generally going to do
22
      ex parte communications in the case.
23
               MR. C. HENRY RITTGERS: That's good to know.
24
               THE COURT: Yeah. In terms of jury instructions,
      I've received both parties' jury instructions and proposed
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verdict forms.

In terms of the supplemental jury instructions, remind me what were the two topics of those?

MR. C. MATTHEW RITTGERS: It was in good faith, Your Honor. The expert testimony, I believe, was --

THE COURT: Okay. Then the question was whether there was going to be an expert witness. Okay. All right.

I know it's a difficult case on the jury instructions because the parties have two, like, vastly different structures of jury instructions, so I don't know -- often you can kind of marry the jury instructions, but the problem here is that the parties -- one side, I think it's the government's, essentially has an eight-page jury instruction that covers all of the Hobbs Act; and, you know, the other side, I think, breaks it down more issue by issue.

I've gone through the jury instructions and the objections, and I can tell you sort of where I am on the objections.

But you get to two different spots. If you start with the defendant's jury instructions and then rule on the government's objections, you end up at spot A.

If you start with the government's jury instructions and rule on the defendant's objections, you end up at point B.

And there's a fair amount of substantive overlap, but there's still some differences with regard to it just because of the

way the difference in the form, the way the parties submitted it, and the granularity. And I think there's a lot more granularity in the defendant jury instructions.

By granularity, I just mean a lot more separate jury instructions that were more combined on the government's side. So I'm struggling a little bit of how to bring some sanity to that process.

Any thoughts, Mr. Singer or Mr. Rittgers or Ms. Glatfelter?

MS. GLATFELTER: Sure. We grouped them together -- I can speak for the government's jury instructions. We grouped them together because that's how the Sixth Circuit proposed for the Hobbs Act, and so the other instructions followed that model.

But I've seen them done both ways, in terms of, you know, breaking the elements down. If the Court wished, I think we could do that with each of the instructions.

We went with the Sixth Circuit pattern since those were the ones available and followed that model, so...

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Rittgers, your thoughts?

MR. C. MATTHEW RITTGERS: Unfortunately, Your Honor,

I don't have much to add.

THE COURT: All right. Well, typically, the way I would do jury instructions is -- because jury instructions may depend, to some extent, on the evidence that's solicited at

trial, or, for example, whether or not experts are called at trial.

Typically, what I would do is, as we get close to the end, I would hold a charging conference after trial one day in advance of closing, and kind of go through it with the parties and come up with the final jury instructions so that the parties have the jury instructions in advance of closing.

But we've waited, sort of, as late as we can during the trial to make sure that the jury instructions match up with the evidence that's actually been presented.

So do you think that's going to work here,

Ms. Glatfelter? I guess you're the jury instruction person.

MS. GLATFELTER: I do, Your Honor. I think, maybe what the Court is struggling a bit with, and we had this in the fall, is that there are some parts in the instruction, such as official act, which is repeated throughout.

I think, from an organizational standpoint, we just have to make a decision whether you want to repeat it three times, or whether it goes in the first one and you refer back, but once the Court makes that decision, I think we all can follow.

I would say, rather than after trial one day, maybe we would adjourn earlier, and we could prepare in advance that this is going to be the charging conference day.

I think this one will probably take a little bit longer than the typical charging conference, just because of the

amount of issues and the fact of some of the objections that need to be resolved.

THE COURT: Yeah. And given what the parties have said about anticipated duration, I think, if we have a pre-qualified four-week jury, there should not be a problem taking a day off at some point to do a charging conference, or at least a half day off, so that makes a lot of sense.

Mr. Rittgers, is that acceptable to the defense?

MR. C. MATTHEW RITTGERS: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: So there are some interesting jury instruction issues. Like I said, I've gone through the objections, and I largely know where I'm at on the various objections.

I don't think it will take all that long once we figure out, you know, just sort of whether we're going to break them up into separate instructions, or whether we're going to give them more as a group. So that's kind of the biggest issue in my mind at this point.

I think I've got everybody's objections on the jury instructions, right? We're all done with that? Good.

Any security considerations in this trial? I'm not anticipating any, but...

MR. C. HENRY RITTGERS: This may be more housekeeping. I would like to keep our stuff, so we're not hauling boxes or whatever we're going to have, at least I'm

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old school, I have paper.
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           Is there a place where I can keep my stuff at night and
 3
      not worry about somebody tampering with it?
               COURTROOM DEPUTY: It can be kept in the courtroom.
 4
 5
               THE COURT: I think the courtroom's locked overnight.
               MR. C. HENRY RITTGERS: Excellent.
 6
                                                    Thank you.
 7
               THE COURT: I assume that that's the technical legal
 8
      term, "stuff." Mr. Singer?
 9
               MR. SINGER: One moment, Your Honor?
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               THE COURT: Sure.
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               MR. SINGER: Your Honor, may the parties approach
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      sidebar to discuss?
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           (This portion of the record was placed under seal by
14
      order of the Court and filed separately.)
               THE COURT: We had a discussion off the record of
15
16
      various security considerations, and we've got an agreement on
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      how we're going to handle issues that we've discussed.
           Moving to the next item. Will this case garner media
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19
      attention? I assume the answer is yes.
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           And are there any specific arrangements that need to be
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      made with regard to that, in anyone's view, other than what we
22
      have already discussed already?
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               MR. C. MATTHEW RITTGERS: Nothing from the defense,
24
      Your Honor.
25
               MR. SINGER: No, Your Honor.
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1 THE COURT: Very good. Anybody anticipate any 2 special hearings outside the presence of the jury, other than 3 with regard to, potentially, this expert issue and voir dire, expert voir dire? 4 5 MR. SINGER: Not that I can think of right now, 6 Your Honor. 7 MR. C. MATTHEW RITTGERS: We agree. 8 THE COURT: Juror questionnaires. Let's talk a 9 little bit about the jury process. The jury questionnaires 10 are usually available one week prior to trial. 11 Regarding voir dire, who is going to conduct it for the 12 government? 13 MR. SINGER: I am, Your Honor. 14 THE COURT: Who is going to conduct it for the defendant? 15 16 MR. C. MATTHEW RITTGERS: I am, Your Honor. 17 THE COURT: If I write Mr. Rittgers, that will be 18 helpful. 19 MR. C. MATTHEW RITTGERS: Matthew. 20 THE COURT: If there are any sensitive questions that 21 you would like the Court to propose to the panel so that you 22 don't need to, just let me know one week prior to trial what 23 those topics would be. I will add them to my voir dire. 24 The way I've been doing voir dire is we bring everybody 25 in. We have a number of them seated in the box, and then the

rest of them seated in the courtroom.

And I ask a relatively extensive set of questions that's designed to elicit whether anybody has close family members who are members of law enforcement, for example. Or I suppose in this case, you know, has anybody in here run for office, or raised money for candidates, or things that one would anticipate might be an issue in the case, and where you might want to elicit whether someone has prior knowledge with regard to those things.

It's a relatively extensive, as I said, voir dire that I try to tailor to the issues that I see in a given case.

After I have completed my voir dire, I allow each of the parties to conduct voir dire. And, generally speaking, what I would like the parties to do is conduct the voir dire from the lectern. So we'll set the lectern up to face the panel, and you can talk to everybody.

I don't like if people ask specific jurors questions just from out of the blue, like, hey, Juror 35, let's talk to you for a moment.

Let's pose the questions to the entire venire, and then if somebody raises their hand, if you want to follow up to get more information from that person, absolutely that's permissible.

But the other thing that I would say is, if there's an answer or an omission on the juror questionnaire that you need

to follow up on that and for some reason I haven't, there's something you saw on a jury questionnaire and you want to follow up with that juror, that's fine.

But what I don't like is if counsel start trying their case through voir dire. If I could present evidence that this and this and this, could you convict? We're not going to do that. We're not going to do our closing as part of voir dire.

And I'm looking at everybody equally on that. We're not going to presell our theories of the case. We're not going to do any of that stuff.

This is supposed to be a relatively streamlined procedure that's designed to allow us to seat a jury that's unbiased with regard to the facts that they're going to hear in this case.

I really want the parties to take that to heart and not give a closing statement with a bunch of question marks in it and then call it voir dire, okay?

After both sides have completed their voir dire, we'll release the jury. At that point, we'll do the jury selection process.

We'll do for cause first, obviously, and go through, and then we're going to do peremptories. I'm thinking six for the government, ten for the defendant on peremptories. They will be exercised as follows.

United States will exercise its first, the defendant will

do its first and second; the United States will then exercise its second, the defendant will exercise its third and fourth; the United States will then exercise their third, the defendant will do fifth and sixth; then the United States fourth, and defendant will do seventh and eighth; then the United States fifth, the defendant ninth; then the United States sixth, and the defendant tenth.

And basically, I've had people ask, do we have to strike people that are already in the box? The way we're going to do this is it's going to be the 12 lowest number of jurors that remain after the strikes will be the jury in the case.

So you can strike Juror Number 81, for all I care. That's probably not going to change the jury if you strike Juror Number 81, but I don't care. You don't have to strike the juror that's in the box. You can use peremptories on any juror you see fit.

Now the next topic I want to discuss is the number of alternate jurors. Typically, I would do two. This is going to be a four-week trial, I was contemplating the possibility of adding one or two alternate jurors. I'm now hearing that this may be more like a two-week trial, so I don't know that we need four alternate jurors.

The countervail intention in my mind is that, on the one hand, you're asking people to donate a lot of their time, only to tell them right when it gets to the part where they're

supposed to start deliberating that, instead, they're excused 1 to go home. So that's a little bit offputting, I can imagine, 2 3 to people who have invested three to four weeks of their time. Conversely, as everybody knows, I think there has been at 4 5 least a mild uptick in COVID numbers. You know, there's 6 always the possibility we may lose one or more jurors during 7 the course of the trial. 8 I forget. I think if we get down to, what is it, ten, 9 we're still okay? Where is the Sixth Circuit at? I don't 10 know that we need to -- I thought 11. Is it 10 or 11? I 11 think there's some case law that allows you in some unique 12 circumstances if people fall off the panel. Am I wrong? 13 MR. SINGER: I'm not sure, Your Honor. 14 MR. C. MATTHEW RITTGERS: I don't know, Your Honor. 15 THE COURT: Okay. Well, in any event, what are 16 people's thoughts on how many alternates we should have, 17 Mr. Singer? MR. SINGER: Your Honor, given where we are with 18 19 COVID cases, three or four makes sense from the government's 20 perspective. 21 THE COURT: Mr. Rittgers? 22 MR. C. MATTHEW RITTGERS: We agree with that, Your 23 Honor. 24 THE COURT: Three or four, which one? 25 MR. SINGER: Let's go with four, Your Honor.

MR. C. MATTHEW RITTGERS: We agree. 1 2 THE COURT: So we'll do four alternates. I think we 3 usually do one strike? COURTROOM DEPUTY: One for every two. 4 5 THE COURT: One for every two? 6 COURTROOM DEPUTY: Yes. 7 THE COURT: So you will get two more strikes. Both 8 the defense and the government will get two more strikes on 9 peremptories after. 10 So we'll seat the first 12, and then we'll move on to 11 alternates, and then -- yes, Mr. Rittgers, Senior? 12 MR. C. HENRY RITTGERS: I understand we're addressing 13 the entire panel. Are they going to be seated in a certain 14 manner so that we know who we're talking to? 15 THE COURT: Sure. I thought I mentioned this. 16 we'll have the first 16, 18? COURTROOM DEPUTY: I believe he has 16. 17 THE COURT: So 16 in the box. So the first 16 will 18 19 be seated in the box. Everybody else will be seated in the 20 gallery, so you can set up to sort of face everybody. 21 They will be seated, obviously, in order of juror number. 22 Hopefully, they usually do a pretty good job of getting them 23 in order. 24 Of course, we're going to refer to everybody by their 25 juror numbers in connection with the voir dire so, you know,

Juror Number 23, you raised your hand, tell me more about X or whatever.

And I'll try to remind them to identify themselves by juror numbers, to speak up when asked questions so we know who it is. Does that answer your question, Mr. Rittgers?

MR. C. HENRY RITTGERS: Yes. Maybe I'm just being too technical here, but will there be some kind of -- I assume that in Judge Black's courtroom, it's going to be similar as far as the makeup of this courtroom, correct?

THE COURT: Well, you should go over and look at it.

I think you guys are going after. It's substantially wider
than this courtroom. I think there's three sets of benches
going across, or two sets of long benches.

COURTROOM DEPUTY: Three.

MR. SINGER: Three.

THE COURT: So there's a lot more seating width-wise.

MR. C. HENRY RITTGERS: So 16 in the box, and number 17 goes in the front, 18, 19, 20, is that the way it works?

THE COURT: Usually. Jennifer Webster's our jury coordinator. She brings them in, she tries to get them seated, and then she calls up where 17 is, and then in this row starts with this number, and then this row starts with this number. And she usually does a pretty good job, so you should know who is sitting everywhere.

MR. C. HENRY RITTGERS: Thank you, Your Honor. 1 2 THE COURT: Juror note taking preferences, 3 Mr. Singer, Ms. Glatfelter? MS. GLATFELTER: Yes. I think it is the practice in 4 5 the courthouse to allow jurors to take notes if they would like to. 6 7 THE COURT: Mr. Rittgers? 8 MR. C. MATTHEW RITTGERS: Your Honor, our personal 9 preference is probably no note taking. 10 THE COURT: Yeah. I would tell you, that was unfair 11 to ask before I told you how I explain it. 12 The Court generally allows jurors to take notes, unless 13 you've got some pretty good arguments as to why you think it's 14 inappropriate in this case. 15 I do give cautionary instructions about not relying on 16 the notes in replacement of memory, not relying on somebody 17 else's notes over your own memory. I understand there's always some risk that notes take on 18 19 some kind of a more authoritative character back in the 20 deliberation room, but I think with a two-week trial, it's a 21 lot to ask people to remember everything without taking any 22 notes, so I'm pretty strong in my mind to allow them to take 2.3 notes. 24 I don't allow them to take their notes with them outside 25 the courthouse. They leave them in the courtroom during the

day. They will have their notes back with them during deliberations, but they'll have cautionary instructions about the notes. We supply, obviously, the notepads, and we keep them at the end. I know that.

Well, let's talk a little bit about masks. What we've been doing is, when we have the entire panel in, the whole venire, we've been having them wear masks just because there's 80 people, 85 people in the courtroom.

But once trial gets started, I've sort of more been leaving that up to the jurors themselves. But I'm happy to hear from the parties if they have a view on this, so Mr. Singer?

 $$\operatorname{MR.}$ SINGER: We would defer to the Court as far as that goes, Your Honor.

MR. C. MATTHEW RITTGERS: Your Honor, would the attorneys during that process be permitted to have their masks off?

THE COURT: Yes. I try to explain that to the venire just because they're obviously seated close together, the attorneys are -- I don't want anybody harboring ill will towards the attorneys because they're not masked when the panel is.

Yes, Mr. Rittgers?

MR. C. HENRY RITTGERS: What about the individual juror that might have a question?

THE COURT: Yes. So when they answer a question, I ask them to pull their mask down to make it easier for you to understand them, and even more importantly to make it easier for our court reporter to understand them.

If I fail to do that, you will hear her gentle, dulcet tones coming in and reminding me that it would help her if I ask the jurors to pull down their masks.

Any other questions on that, Mr. Rittgers?

MR. C. HENRY RITTGERS: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Very good. In terms of how I like to conduct a trial. For objections, please stand when you make an objection, just so I can see who is making the objection.

If you'd just rise and say I object, just one word. I object, hearsay. I object, relevance. If I want more, I'll ask you for more.

If, for some reason, you believe you need a sidebar, you can ask for a sidebar, we can go over to sidebar and handle whatever.

I personally think it's helpful if we try to keep sidebars to a minimum, so if it's something that you think is really crucial, let's do it. But, you know, I just recently had a jury trial that was sidebar every ten minutes, and I think it's a little broken up for the jury when we do that. So whatever counsel can do to minimize that is great.

I'm generally not going to hear much argument on the

objections. You make the objections. If, for some reason, you really feel the need to make an argument, we can do that at sidebar. Generally speaking, I will rule pretty quickly on the objections.

In terms of examination of witnesses, I'm assuming counsel will conduct their examination of witnesses from the lectern.

You can approach witnesses if you need to give them something to refresh their recollection. Before you leave the lectern and head towards the witness, if you could give me a heads up like, Your Honor, may I approach, or something like that, that would be helpful and appreciated.

If you want to come around the lectern, and I guess some people call it the one-arm rule, you know, stay within one arm of the lectern one way or the other. If you feel like that helps you connect with the jury or whatever, that's fine.

I will say the mics are pretty directional, and if the court reporter is having difficulty hearing you, that's going to create a problem for her, which in turn creates a problem for me, which will in turn create a problem for you. So try to make sure you're speaking into the mic from wherever you're at, and I think everything will go all right.

I am hoping that counsel will instruct their witnesses to answer questions in a courteous fashion. Evasive answers, disrespect to opposing counsel, I really like to try to keep

that to a minimum.

I'd appreciate your cooperation with regard to the witnesses that you're kind of sponsoring by putting on the stand to answer questions in an appropriate fashion.

And I expect counsel to extend the same courtesy to the witnesses. Importantly, counsel and the witnesses can't get into a situation where they're talking over each other.

So if you're having a difficulty with someone who, in your view, is not answering a question or answering too much of a question and just going on and on and on, ask for my help. I will provide it.

The solution for that is not to start trying to clip the witness's answers by talking over the witness while the witness is still talking. I will instruct witnesses to answer the question that's been posed to them.

I'm not a big believer that you get to force somebody into a yes or no by saying, well, I asked it as a yes or no question. Well, sometimes it's not a yes or no answer. That's just the way it's going to be. But if witnesses are using that as an excuse to be evasive, I will assist in preventing that.

There's a number of attorneys in here. I'm assuming that there's going to be one attorney who is responsible for each witness. And by responsible for witness, I mean will do the direct on that witness or the cross-exam on that witness, and

then will also handle objections to whoever is doing the direct or cross-examination for the other side.

So I don't want an attorney who is responsible for asking the question, and a different one who is responsible for objecting. If it's your witness, you can object with regard to that witness as well.

When you're done with a witness, if you can tell me before you just leave the lectern and walk and sit down. Just say, Your Honor, we're finished with this witness or whatever. Just let me know.

I'm fine if you want to leave the lectern and consult with your cocounsel or your client about whether there are more questions that should be asked. You could just say, Your Honor, could I have a minute to consult, I'm happy to give it to you.

It's just, generally, when people are leaving the lectern, I like to have some sense of where they're headed and why before they do it. If we follow that, I think we'll all get along famously.

That was sort of what I had on my list. Are there other questions that people would like to talk about today?

MR. SINGER: Not from the government, Your Honor.

MR. C. MATTHEW RITTGERS: Not from the defense, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, obviously, we've got to get

that order on with respect to the FBI letter, and I'll try to do that promptly. You guys have some homework in terms of getting back to me with regard to the experts.

Oh, there is one more matter on jury instructions. So preliminary instructions, absolutely can't wait for the charging conference on those. Let's get to what we can for an agreement with regard to preliminary instructions.

I just give the standard Sixth Circuit preliminary instructions, so if you guys want additional things -- and, as I said, we are going to want some clarification around this PAC stuff, either by way of preliminary instructions or by way of expert.

I know we haven't figured out exactly which of those we're going to do, but to the extent it's going to be preliminary instructions, we need to get those hammered out sooner rather than later.

With regard to what we're going to do at the close, I've done it two ways so far. So there's instructions as to the substantive law, and then there's instructions about how the jury should deliberate, right, like you should pick a foreperson, and when you deliberate, you should listen to each other and all that stuff.

I have, on a few occasions now, given the substantive law instructions prior to closing. So after the parties have rested but prior to closing, I'll instruct them, the jury, on

the law, the substantive law, so that when the parties refer to it in closing, they can say, as you've already heard from the Court, blah blah blah blah blah, and then I'll finish up with the here's how you guys get along in the jury room instructions after closing.

Or alternatively, I've had cases where parties strongly prefer doing the closings first, and then having all of the instructions, substantive and procedural instructions, read after the closings.

Of course, you've got the Court's jury instructions, so you can say you will hear from the Court that blah blah blah blah blah, and then I'll say it after.

I generally have felt like it's worked better if I get the substantive instructions in advance of closings, and then have closings, and then give the procedural instructions, but I don't have a strong preference if the parties would prefer to do it a different way so, Mr. Singer?

MR. SINGER: Your Honor, I think we have a strong preference for the former, where the jury is instructed about the law, the parties will give their closing arguments, and then the final instructions.

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Rittgers?

MR. C. MATTHEW RITTGERS: So substantive instruction would be before the closing?

THE COURT: Yes. So after the defense rests, you

know, then I would read the substantive instructions. Say, you know, both sides have now rested. I'm going to read you some instructions about the law, then we'll hear closings from the parties.

And then after the government's done with their rebuttal, I would say I have just a few more instructions for you now, and then those would all be the procedural ones, like select a person to act as your foreperson, this person will speak for you in court. When you're deliberating, listen with an open mind, reminder probably about the juror note taking and all that just at the end. Does that make sense?

MR. C. MATTHEW RITTGERS: It does. When, if ever, would the jurors have your printed instructions?

THE COURT: Thank you. So the jurors will have -- so while I'm reading them, the jurors have them, because I think it's easier for people to follow if they both hear and read, and some of these are pretty complicated. So they will have a copy, each of them will have a copy while I read it to them.

And then in the jury room for deliberations, there will be one copy of complete instructions, both substantive and procedural. In other words, I just make a set of all the jury instructions, and I just stop reading them at a point. So I'll say now we'll hear the closings.

But it's just one set of jury instructions. All the jurors will have that at their seats when I'm reading them,

1 but then back in the jury room, there will be one set of the 2 entire instructions that they can refer to during the 3 deliberations. Does that make sense? MR. C. MATTHEW RITTGERS: It does, Your Honor. May I 4 5 have one moment? 6 THE COURT: Sure. 7 MR. C. MATTHEW RITTGERS: Your Honor, we would prefer 8 the substantive instructions to be read after closing. 9 THE COURT: Okay. All right. I will take that under 10 advisement. I'll advise you as to what I'm going to do with 11 regard to that. Any reason why, in particular, Mr. Rittgers? 12 MR. C. MATTHEW RITTGERS: I think that having the 13 jurors hear the substantive instructions from a court, 14 obviously, they're an important figure who they should be 15 listening to, they might then come to a conclusion before 16 listening to argument because they are applying the facts of 17 the law as you give it to them and then might not be 18 interested in hearing argument. 19 THE COURT: Mr. Singer, any response? 20 MR. SINGER: Your Honor, the evidence is the evidence 21 that will be presented at trial. Closing arguments are not 22 the evidence. 23 THE COURT: Right. 24 MR. SINGER: From the government's perspective, 25 having the instructions first will allow them to put the

1 arguments into better context. 2 THE COURT: That has been my experience. But I hear 3 what you're saying, Mr. Rittgers. I'll take it under advisement and let you know in advance of trial which way 4 5 we're going to do that. 6 Any other issues anybody wants to raise before the Court 7 before we adjourn, Mr. Singer? 8 MR. SINGER: No, Your Honor. 9 MR. C. MATTHEW RITTGERS: No, Your Honor. 10 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. I think we're 11 ready to adjourn now. 12 (Proceedings concluded at 12:01 p.m.) 13 14 15 C E R T I F I C A T E16 17 I, M. SUE LOPREATO, RMR, CRR, certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from the record of proceedings in the 18 above-entitled matter. 19 20 <u>June</u> 8, 2022 /s/ M. Sue Lopreato M. SUE LOPREATO, RMR, CRR 21 Official Court Reporter 22 23 24 2.5